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Abstract
We model unawareness of possibilities in decision-making and (linguistic)
pragmatic reasoning. A background model is ﬁltered through a state of
limited awareness to provide the epistemic state of an agent who is not
attending to all possibilities. We extend the standard notion of awareness
with assumptions (implicit beliefs about propositions the agent is un-
aware of) and deﬁne a dynamic update for ‘becoming aware.’ We give a
propositional model and a decision-theoretic model, and suggest that de-
cision problems should in general be seen as ﬁltered models in this sense,
describing only those features of the situation which the modeller consid-
ers relevant and the agent is aware of. We show how pragmatic relevance
reasoning can be described in this framework, extending a standard deﬁ-
nition to the case of awareness updates. An utterance can be relevant even
if semantically uninformative, if it brings relevant alternatives to aware-
ness. This gives an explanation for the use of possibility modals and ques-
tions as hedged suggestions, bringing possibilities to awareness but only
implicating their degree of desirability or probability.
The authors are listed in alphabetical order.2
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1 Introduction
Example 1: Little Bo Peep. Little Bo Peep has lost her keys and doesn’t
know where to ﬁnd them. She’s checking her pockets, the nail behind the
door, beside the telephone, and so on, but the keys are nowhere to be found.
Frustrated and pouting, Bo slams onto the sofa. From his corner Little Jack
Horner helps her out:
jack: Did you leave them in the car when you came in drunk last
night?
Little Bo slaps her forehead (and his, impudent little scamp) and goes out to
the car. At this point of the story, it is equally reasonable that the search ends
successfully, or to imagine Bo’s frustration continuing until she ﬁnds her keys
several days later in the sugar jar.
Nobody should have trouble understanding at an intuitive level the kinds
of changes Little Bo Peep’s epistemic state undergoes in this example. Bo
didn’t think of the car as a possible place to look for the keys, but when Jack
mentioned it to her, her oversight struck her as foolish and she promptly took
the proper action. Should anybody be worried about a situation as common-
place as this?
Peculiarities show up, though, once we take a closer look. Most impor-
tantly, Jack manages to change Bo’s epistemic state in quite a signiﬁcant way,
simply by asking her a question. Since under any standard semantic analysis
questions are uninformative, there is some explaining to be done here. Before
we get sidetracked by considering rhetorical questioning or possible prag-
matic analyses, though, consider the following alternatives to Jack’s helpful
observation:
(1) Jack: Do you think it’s possible the keys are in the car?
(2) Jack: The keys might be in the car.
(3) Jack: [Not paying attention] Hey, this tv show is really funny, this guy is
looking everywhere for his keys and they were in his car the whole
time!
(4) Advertiser on tv: Do you forget your keys in the car? You need the
ExtendaWristLock KeyChain! (Patent pending.) Order now and pay
just $19.99!
(5) Passing motorist: Honk honk!
Bo’s response to any of these might quite naturally be the same: she slaps
her forehead at her foolishness and goes immediately to check the car. While
the ﬁrst two should be amenable to pragmatic explanation, this clearly won’t
do for the others.
Intuitively what’s going on here is that Bo is failing to consider a possi-
bility, which when brought to her attention she realises should not be ruled
out. We will say that Bo is unaware of the possibility that the keys might
be in the car and we will investigate this kind of epistemic attitude both for-
mally and in linguistic applications in this paper. Indeed, something like our
notion of awareness has been approached sidelong in the linguistic literature,4
but until quite recently has received no thorough treatment. The recent ex-
ception is work by Eric Swanson on meaning and use of the epistemic modal
‘might’ ([Swa06b], extended in [Swa06a]) which is very close in spirit, but not
in speciﬁcs, to our approach. Outside linguistics, however, a formal notion
of unawareness of possibilities has been explored very fruitfully in theoretical
computer science (the standard reference for the origin of the ﬁeld is [FH88])
and has recently been applied variously in rational choice theory, i.e., game
and decision theory ([Fei04; Fei05; HR06]; we describe other related work in
Section 5). We aim to combine these insights with a linguistic treatment, and
show the surprising range of outstanding linguistic puzzles that the notion is
applicable to.
So what is unawareness of a contingency? Here are three basic interrelated
properties of the notion in question.
Slogan 1: Unawareness is not uncertainty. Little Bo Peep’s behaviour (pout-
ing, sitting on the couch) does not indicate uncertainty about whether the
keys are in the car. At the point of the story where Bo gives up the search, it is
implausible to assume that she puts any credence, however small, on the pos-
sibility that the keys are in the car; if she did, she would surely have gone and
checked. Judging from her behavior, if anything, it seems as if Bo believes that
the keys are not in the car. We will say that Bo has an implicit belief that the
keys are not in the car and argue that, ﬁrstly, implicit beliefs are different from
the more familiar explicit beliefs (see the next two slogans) and that, secondly,
unawareness of a possibility typically goes together with an implicit belief we
call an assumption.1 Implicit beliefs are typically assumptions of ‘normality’
(we’ll discuss them in more detail, including the connection to closed-world
reasoning, in Section 2.3).
Slogan 2: Unawareness is not introspective. Although Bo’s behavior indi-
cates an implicit belief, she does not explicitly (or consciously) believe that the
keys are not in the car. In fact, she holds no explicit beliefs about the car, not
even the tautological belief that the keys are either in the car or elsewhere. A
self-referential way to get to grips with this fundamental intuition is to say
that she is unaware of her own implicit beliefs. This failure of (negative) in-
trospection2 leads us to a deﬁnition of awareness in terms of the language Bo
uses: if she were asked to describe all her beliefs about the keys she would not
mention the car at all. (If prompted she might start enumerating tautologies:
“The keys aren’t on the table, so I suppose logically speaking they’re either on
the table or not on the table”; she would never, however, extend this sequence
with “The keys are either in the car or not in the car”.) The formal model we
give in Section 2 will distinguish syntactically between the agent language
Bo would use spontaneously to describe her explicit beliefs and the language
we as modellers use to describe her implicit beliefs.
1Although the point will not be appreciated until we have presented our model, in the interests
of fairness we should point out that the slogan “Unawareness is not uncertainty” has a slightly
different connotation in the rational choice literature. We describe the differences between the
two notions in Section 5.
2She does not know, but does not know that she does not know. [MR94] and [DLR98] show that
unawareness must be more than simply failure of negative introspection, if we are to capture the
properties we want. Still, starting with this notion is a good way to get the intuitive juices ﬂowing
in the right direction.5
Slogan 3: Unawareness is easily overturned. Bo’s implicit belief is very frag-
ile, in a way that her explicit beliefs are generally not: it does not take any
particularly convincing argument to overturn it. The example shares with
other crucial examples in this paper what we might call the ‘forehead-slap
property’: in becoming aware of her implicitly held belief, Bo realises the
mistake she made in overlooking a certain (intuitively: relevant) possibility.
We will concern ourselves exclusively with unawareness of this kind in this
paper: unawareness through inattentiveness or absent-mindedness.3 Indeed, as
the alternative (5) in Example 1 shows, overturning this kind of unawareness
need not even involve anything linguistic or intentional. But where language
is concerned, we argue that the mere mentioning of some possibility that an
agent is unaware of is sufﬁcient for this unawareness to be overturned. This
is why it is not possible to talk to Bo about her implicit beliefs: if Jack were
to ask her the question in (1), we might imagine her answer to be something
like: “Well, now that you ask me I do, but I wouldn’t have if you hadn’t.”
1.1 Pragmatic considerations (Farmer Pickles bakes a cake)
Not being attentive to all possibly relevant factors in, say, a decision-making
situation such as Bo’s key-search is anything but unusual. Similarly, it is
perfectly natural for conversationalists to attend to possible unawareness. The
most interesting cases seem to occur when a speaker has enough information
to motivate an awareness update, but not enough to say anything stronger
(such as “I saw your keys in the car,” “You always leave your keys in the car,”
or similar). Since questions usually don’t carry assertive force, they are often
a good way to produce only an awareness update, with no corresponding
speaker commitments. (Other possibilities include possibility statements with
“might” or “could”, explicit epistemic hedging as in “They’re not in the car, I
presume”, and so on.)
It is because Jack ﬁnds it likely that Bo is unaware of the car as a possible
hide-out for the keys that he asks his question; we feel, even more strongly,
that Jack ﬁrst and foremost intends to make Bo aware with his question (he
does not want an answer in the ﬁrst place; he is not himself interested in the
information he is ‘ofﬁcially’ asking for). Moreover, it is natural for Jack to as-
sume that thus making Bo aware will have a relevant impact on her decisions
to act. And, Bo, in turn, might recognize that Jack is making her aware of
something which he deems relevant to the case at hand. This recognition of
the nature of Jack’s conversational move might, of course, trigger (or at least
license) further pragmatic reasoning on Bo’s side: for instance, Bo might con-
clude that, since Jack is obviously a helpful (though impudent) little scamp,
he himself must deem it sufﬁciently likely that the keys might be in the car.
In Bo’s case the awareness update produces the desired effect without
needing any pragmatic reasoning (this is why a passing motorist can unin-
tentionally trigger exactly the same update for Bo). However this need not be
the case, as shown in the following example.
Example 2: Bob the Baker. Bob (who is an expert baker) is visiting his friend
Farmer Pickles (who isn’t).
3Again, this distinguishes our approach from the rational choice literature; see Section 5.6
pickles: I was going to bake a cake but I haven’t got any eggs!
bob: Did you think of making shortbread instead?
pickles: I didn’t, in fact I didn’t even know that you don’t need
eggs to make shortbread! Thanks, Bob!
Since Pickles isn’t an experienced baker, his unawareness of shortbread as
an option conceals a real uncertainty about whether the recipe requires eggs or
not. Simply overturning this unawareness by accident (as the passing motorist
might have done for Bo) would not produce the effect we see here: ﬂipping
through his cookbook he might see a photograph of shortbread, but he would
have to check the recipe to see whether there are eggs in the ingredients list
or not. Assuming that Bob is being helpful, though, Pickles can reason as
follows: “Bob is deliberately bringing up a possibility because he thinks I’m
overlooking it; that’s only helpful if I should in fact consider it; then he should
at least hold it possible that shortbread doesn’t require eggs; but Bob is an
expert baker, so he wouldn’t be uncertain about such things; so he must believe
that you don’t need eggs to make shortbread.” Pickles’ response, showing that
he makes this inference, seems perfectly natural; but it can only be justiﬁed
(that crucial ﬁrst step) by taking the sort of unawareness perspective we argue
for.
1.2 Paper overview
We will be concerned with the dynamics of an agent’s awareness and its role in
conversation in this paper. Our main aim is to apply insights from the study of
unawareness in rational choice theory to linguistics. In particular, we would
like to show how awareness dynamics are applicable to a surprising range
of outstanding linguistic puzzles. Towards this end, we seek to represent
unawareness in (multi-speaker) discourse and investigate how and to what
effect conversation changes the epistemic states of conversationalists.
In the next section we will introduce a formal representation of unaware-
ness and implicit belief. Section 3 describes the dynamics of awareness up-
dates and their interaction with factual information growth, while Section 4
works out an example of pragmatic reasoning based on awareness dynamics
in detail. Finally, we site our work in the intersection between linguistics and
rational choice in Section 5, before Section 6 concludes.
2 Formalising unawareness
We’ll start by presenting a simple propositional model of awareness and its
dynamics, just enough to model Little Bo Peep’s predicament, in Section 2.1.
We will then extend this basic propositional treatment to decisions under
growing awareness in Section 2.2. In both sections, we will start by developing
the basic formal notions alongside a few intuitive examples; in the decision-
theoretic case in particular the deﬁnitions will undergo some revision as we
introduce complications. For the reader’s convenience, all ﬁnal deﬁnitions are
collected at the end of each section, in Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 on page 8 (for the
propositional case) and Deﬁnitions 3–7 in Section 2.2.4 (for decision problems
in full detail).7
2.1 The propositional case
We start with a set P of proposition letters, representing as usual state-
ments about how the world might be. For Bo these express the location of
the key: “(they’re in her) pocket”, “nail”, “phone”, “car”, and “sugar-jar”
and so on. A possible world w is associated with a valuation function
vw: P ! f0,1g as is usual. Since in fact (and according to Bo’s most funda-
mental beliefs) the keys can only be in one place at a time, we only need to
look at a few of the combinatorially possible worlds, and we can give them
the same names as the propositions themselves: “pocket” is the world where
the proposition “pocket” is true and none of the others is. We’ll call this full
set W: W = fpocket,nail,phone,car,sugar-jarg.
In a standard model, then, Bo’s epistemic state would be the set of worlds
she has not ruled out by observation or other trustworthy information sources.
We’ll call this her information set s. We would standardly assume that Bo’s
initial information set s0, before her search starts, is simply W, i.e., her infor-
mation rules out none of the worlds in question (this may of course change as
she learns more). However according to our observation of Bo’s behaviour, her
epistemic state as our story opens seems instead to be fpocket,nail,phoneg
(these are the places that she goes on to check before giving up in frustra-
tion). We’ll capture this by ﬁltering her information set through an aware-
ness state a, which models the proposition letters she is unaware of, and
the assumptions she holds about their valuation. (Strictly this might be bet-
ter named an “unawareness state”; we will use the terms interchangeably.)
Formally, an awareness state a is a pair hU,vi where U  P is the set of un-
mentionables (proposition letters the agent is unaware of; we will mention
them frequently but the agent herself may not) and v: U ! f0,1g is a val-
uation function giving the assumptions the agent holds. In Bo’s case, we
initially have U = fcar,sugar-jarg and v = fcar 7! 0,sugar-jar 7! 0g, i.e., she
assumes (in typical ‘default’ fashion) that the keys are not in the car and not
in the sugar jar. Taking a different perspective, an awareness state a speciﬁes
a set of worlds Wa = fw 2 W ; v  vwg, those worlds in W which agree with
the assumptions. This latter, equivalent view of awareness states facilitates
the deﬁnition of ﬁltering through awareness: we’ll write sa for Bo’s infor-
mation set filtered through her awareness, and deﬁne sa = s \Wa. Taken
together, s captures the complete factual information an agent like Bo has: s
would be her epistemic state if she was aware of all relevant contingencies; Wa
is the set of worlds she entertains given her (possibly limited) awareness;
and sa is the subset of these worlds that her information does not rule out,
the ones which generate her beliefs.
As our story opens, Bo has no factual information, but she is unaware of
some propositions: s0a0 = Wa0 = fpocket,nail,phoneg. But, if this is Bo’s
epistemic state, she should believe that the keys are not in the car. That’s
true from the modellers perspective (her implicit belief) but her explicit be-
liefs shouldn’t mention the car at all. As we argued for in connection with
the slogan “Awareness is not introspective”, we rely on a syntactic notion to
capture this: a belief formula f can be explicit with respect to an epistemic
state under unawareness sa only if f does not use any proposition letters in
U. These are the unmentionables according to Bo’s awareness, and her explicit
beliefs must not mention them. (This story is explicitly intensional: what mat-8
ters is not the extension of the proposition letters, but whether their names
appear in U. This is what allows us to exclude a tautology such as “The keys
are either in the car or not in the car” from Bo’s explicit beliefs.)
Let’s now try to model the different kinds of updates given in the story:
factual and awareness. Given Bo’s initial information set s0 = W and aware-
ness Wa0 = s0a0 = fpocket,nail,phoneg, she begins to systematically in-
vestigate the three places she is aware of as possible hide-outs for the keys,
and eliminates them one by one. Now s1 = fcar,sugar-jarg but she has not
gained awareness of anything new: a1 = a0, so s1a1 = ?! This explains
Bo’s frustration: as far as she can see, she is in the inconsistent state. How-
ever inconsistency with unawareness is not as destructive as in the standard
picture: it’s quite natural for Bo to realise that there is (or that there must
be) some possibility she has missed. Her frustration arises because nothing
in the situation gives her any guidance as to what this might be, so there’s
no reasonable action she can take to get out of the trap she’s entered.4 But,
then comes Jack’s offhand question from his corner, and the scales fall from
Bo’s eyes! That is, on hearing an expression mentioning the proposition letter
“car”, Bo becomes aware of it: it disappears from her (un)awareness state.
So a2 = hfsugar-jarg,fsugar-jar 7! 0gi and Wa2 = fpocket,nail,phone,carg;
s1a2 = fcarg, and it’s easy to see why Bo immediately runs to check the car.
For convenience we collect here the formal features of this model.
Definition 1: Propositional unawareness. Let P be a set of proposition let-
ters and W a set of worlds, with each world w 2 W associated with a valuation
function vw: P ! f0,1g. An epistemic state for an agent is a pair hs,ai
with s an information set (a subset of W representing the worlds that her
information has not ruled out) and a is an awareness state. The awareness
state a = hU,vi speciﬁes her unmentionables U  P and assumptions
v: U ! f0,1g, that is, the proposition letters she is unaware of and the truth-
values she unconsciously assumes they hold. The state a gives rise to a set of
worlds Wa = fw 2 W ; v  vwg, the worlds entertained by the agent. An
information state under unawareness sa (also to be read as s filtered
through a) is simply s \Wa.
For clarity we deﬁne here also the syntactic sublanguages we use, although
these will feature only implicitly in the rest of the paper.
Definition 2: Syntax and belief statements. The language we deﬁne con-
tains two belief operators for each agent: Bi (for implicit belief) and Be (for
explicit belief). An awareness state a = hU,vi deﬁnes an agent language
La, the language inductively deﬁned using only the mentionable proposi-
tion letters P nU and the explicit belief operator Be. Implicit belief corresponds
to belief in a standard model: Bi(f) holds for an agent in epistemic state sa
iff sa supports f. However explicit belief has a stronger requirement: Be(f)
holds in sa iff Bi(f) holds and f 2 La. (Under this deﬁnition all explicit
beliefs are implicit; we will often use “implicit belief” loosely where “strictly
implicit belief” would be more correct.)
4Another natural reaction would be to search again the places she has already looked. This shows
another way that inconsistency might not be fatal: if some of the information leading to it turns
out to be incorrect. However this perspective requires belief revision as opposed to update, and
has little to do with awareness.9
2.2 Decision problems and awareness dynamics
Strictly speaking, the propositional treatment of Bo’s growing awareness is a
rather crude oversimpliﬁcation: names such as “pocket” or “car” could at the
same time represent states of the world (“(they’re in her) pocket”) or actions
that Bo might wish to execute (“(search in her) pocket”). So, for example,
when we concluded that in the epistemic state s1a2 = fcarg, where Bo is
aware of the car as the only open possibility, she would go check the car, we
have silently succumbed to this equivocation between states and actions. But
when the identiﬁcation of propositions and actions is unwarranted, an exten-
sion of the analysis of awareness dynamics to decision problems is called for;
not least because unawareness of propositions shows ﬁrst and foremost in the
agent’s behavior. However, formalizing the dynamics of awareness of decision
makers is not a trivial task and the ﬁnal model is rather complex. In order
to keep the exposition perspicuous we will have to work towards it in stages.
We will start with a na¨ ıve approach, present a number of problems that arise,
and thus hope to motivate the additional complexity of the solutions we’ve
chosen to apply at each step. We end with ﬁnal deﬁnitions in Section 2.2.4.
2.2.1 The basic picture
A decision problem is usually conceived as a tuple hS, A,P,Ui where S is
a set of relevantly distinct states of the world, A a set of possible actions,
P a probability distribution over S, and U: S  A ! R is a utility function
giving a numerical desirability for each action in each state. There is a sense
in which this deﬁnition already implicitly includes unawareness, in its limited
set S and, more palpably even, in the limited actions A under consideration:
common sense dictates that when modelling a particular decision problem we
do not include in S every potentially relevant distinction of the state of the
world that may affect the outcome of the agent’s choice of action, but only
certain distinctions that the agent can entertain herself (given her awareness-
limited vocabulary); similarly, and more obviously even, we do not want to
include in A all conceivably possible actions but only the ones that the agent
is aware of as relevant to the task at hand. One of the main ideas we wish to
stress in this paper is that a classical decision problem should be seen as an
agent’s limited subjective conceptualization of a decision making situation:
Slogan 4: Decision problems represent subjective awareness. A decision
problem, which by deﬁnition includes only a small set of states and possible
actions and thus restricts attention to only a small facet of reality, represents
the agent’s subjective assessment of the relevant factors of the situation, given
her state of awareness.
Here is a simple example for the kind of subjective unawareness repre-
sented in decision problems. At the beginning of her search, Bo is aware of
the nail, the phone and her pocket as places where her keys might be. Her
decision problem d = hS, A,P,Ui which comprises her limited awareness at
this point of the story contains exactly these states:
S = fnail,phone,pocketg.
We assume that the actual state is “sugar-jar” but this is a state that Bo is nei-10
ther entertaining, nor considering possible at the outset. Instead, Bo considers
all and only the states in S possible. This is represented in the decision prob-
lem d by assuming that the probability distribution P, which captures Bo’s
beliefs, has full support, i.e., assigns some non-zero probability to all states in
S. (By deﬁnition it can assign no probability outside the states given by the
decision problem.) The actions Bo can take in this key-search scenario corre-
spond one-to-one with the possible states (“(the keys are in her) pocket” and
“(search in her) pocket”) and so we can, for modelling purposes, use the same
names for states and actions: A = S. (Whence the constant equivocation in
the exposition of the propositional case.) And, of course, since we assume
that Bo wants to ﬁnd the keys, her utility function should be something like
(formally some positive linear transformation of):
U(s,a) =
(
1 if s = a
0 otherwise.
Taken as a whole, then, the decision problem d represents Bo’s own subjective
assessment of the decision situation under her own limited awareness.
It is obvious how this model of Bo’s epistemic state would treat factual
information ﬂow. If Bo learns (for instance, by checking) that the keys are not
on the nail, she would revise her probabilistic beliefs (by a simple Bayesian
update with the proposition “:nail”). But what about extending Bo’s aware-
ness? Suppose, whatever her probabilistic beliefs P might be, that she becomes
aware of the car as a possible hide-out of the keys and of the corresponding
action “car”. Most straight-forwardly, we would like to update Bo’s decision
problem d so as to include a state and action “car”. This much is easy. But
what should Bo’s probabilistic beliefs be after she becomes aware of the new
contingency? And what would her utilities be in the new updated decision
problem?
Clearly, we would not want to specify these features by hand with every
update. We would much prefer a model which fully determines the outcome
of an awareness update. This is where the idea of ﬁltering that we used in the
propositional case applies: in order to model how a single agent’s epistemic
state changes under growing awareness we assume that there is a structure
in the background, called a background model, which represents the agent’s
epistemic state under full awareness; unawareness is then modelled by an
awareness state as a restriction, or ﬁlter, on the background model; the out-
come of the ﬁltering process is (or gives rise to) a decision problem, which is
interpreted as the agent’s assessment under limited awareness in line with the
above slogan. Awareness updates are then fairly simple updates of the aware-
ness state (basically: adding or removing elements from sets), which however
may have rather far-reaching repercussions on the agent’s decision problem
via the background model and ﬁltering.
Here is a ﬁrst simpliﬁed attempt at implementing this architecture for
Bo’s decision problem. We assume in the background another decision prob-
lem d = hS, A,P,Ui which represents Bo’s decision problem under full
awareness. According to our slogan this should also represent subjective
awareness; indeed, it represents the features the modeller is aware of as possi-
bly relevant. So, for this background model in Bo’s case we have chosen
S = A = fnail,phone,pocket,car,sugar-jarg11
(taking advantage again of the naming convention conﬂating states, proposi-
tions and actions) and appropriate beliefs P and utilities U. We should con-
sider d the equivalent of the information set s in the propositional case: d
contains all the factual information that Bo would have under full awareness.
This background structure d is then ﬁltered through an awareness state, as
before in the propositional case. Of course, our propositional awareness states
had no component to represent awareness of actions, while Bo’s restricted
awareness is both a restriction on the set of states S and on the set of possible
actions A. Consequently, we need to enrich the notion of an awareness state
to include a component A, analagous to U, which represents the actions the
agent is unaware of: our new awareness states will be triples hU,v,Ai where
A is a subset of A giving the actions the agent does not consider.5
In Bo’s case, it makes sense to assume that U and v are as before: Bo’s
initial awareness state a0, before she starts her search, has her aware of “nail”,
“phone” and “pocket” as the possible states and possible actions, so that:
U = fcar,sugar-jarg
v = fcar 7! 0,sugar-jar 7! 0g
A = fcar,sugar-jarg.
Just as in the propositional case we can deﬁne Sa as the set of states from S
that are compatible with the assumptions of a.
Filtering d through this awareness state gives us the restricted decision
problem d that we started with. In general, ﬁltering in this case comes down
to this: if d = hS, A,P,Ui is a decision problem and a = hU,v,Ai then
the ﬁltered decision problem da is the decision problem hS, A,P,Ui with6
S = S
a
A = A n A
P = P(jS
a)
U = U(S  A).
The set Sa of states being entertained drives the agent’s probabilistic beliefs
under limited awareness by updating P, the agent’s beliefs under full aware-
ness, with all implicit assumptions the agent is making due to her unaware-
ness. This is exactly what the beliefs in P(jSa) represent.
Suppose that in Bo’s d the probabilities are 0.24 for each of “nail”, “phone”,
“pocket” and “car”, and 0.04 for “sugar-jar”. In her initial state of unaware-
ness she holds states “nail”, “phone” and “pocket” possible, each with prob-
ability 1
3 (because P(nailj fnail,phone,pocketg) = 0.24
0.96 = 1
3). If she becomes
aware of new possibilities without eliminating the existing ones by searching
(if Jack helps her out before her search begins, for instance) these probabilities
5Some readers might wonder at this point whether it would pay to adopt a representation of
decision problems in the style of [Jef65], where actions are treated as propositions. After all, this
would allow us to treat unawareness of actions on a par with unawareness of propositions and
therefore seems prima facie the simpler modelling solution. We reject this alternative for a number
of reasons, the most interesting of which in the present context is that we would like to side-step
the question which kinds of (implicit) beliefs an agent has about actions that she is unaware of.
6Strictly speaking, we’d have to deﬁne P = P(jS
a)S
a. However, here and in the following we
rule readability over formal precision.12
decrease: to 1
4 if she becomes aware of the car, and to the limit value of 0.24
under full awareness.
Awareness dynamics are now easy to deﬁne. If Bo becomes aware of
the proposition and action “car” we simply remove this proposition from
U and the corresponding assumption from v (thus enlarging the set of en-
tertained states Sa), removing also the corresponding action from A. The
background model makes sure that utilities and probabilities are deﬁned in
the updated decision problem which is retrieved from ﬁltering through this
updated awareness state. Effectively, this ﬁltering process allows an easy im-
plementation of deterministic awareness updates on decision problems: we,
as modellers, specify the limit-stage of the agent’s growing awareness to the
extend that it is important for the modelling purposes. We also have a simple
structure that captures which bits and pieces the agent is aware of. Simply
adding the parameters that the agent becomes aware of to her awareness state
in the most straight-forward fashion produces, via the background decision
problem, the new and updated decision problem with all (numerical) infor-
mation speciﬁed correctly.
2.2.2 Reﬁnement 1: Individuating states, unawareness without assump-
tions
Bo’s key-search example is fairly simple because propositions, states and ac-
tions correspond one-to-one and so the awareness update involved a nearly
trivial extension of the idea of ﬁltering from the propositional case to a richer
decision-theoretic structure. Bob’s shortbread suggestion in Example 2, on
the other hand, requires further scrutiny of the notion of a state and another
revision to the notion of an awareness state. Here is why.
Let’s ﬁrst consider the most intuitive background decision model for Farmer
Pickles’ epistemic state in Example 2. What would his decision problem
look like if he were aware of all contingencies that we as modellers are in-
terested in? First of all, Pickles considered baking a cake a possible action
and he is made aware of a further possible action, namely baking shortbread.
We should maybe allow Pickles to abstain from all baking, but further ac-
tions clearly do not play a role, so that for the background decision model
d = hS, A,P,Ui we should assume that
A = fcake,shortbread,abstaing.
But what should Pickles’ assessment of the relevant states be (from the mod-
eller’s perspective)? Pickles knows that there are no eggs available, so this
is not something that the model needs to distinguish. But there is a relevant
piece of subjective uncertainty that we would like to model and that is whether
the recipe for shortbread contains eggs or not. So, when fully aware, Pickles
would make a distinction between two possible relevant states of affairs, one
in which baking shortbread requires eggs and another one in which it does
not:
S = fsb-req-eggs,sb-req-no-eggsg.
It is not signiﬁcant at the moment whether Pickles has any beliefs as to which
state is more likely, but we should assume that he does not rule out any state
completely. So again we assume that P has full support on S. As for utilities,13
it is natural to assume that U is a function that orders state-action pairs as
follows:
h,cakei,hsb-req-eggs,shortbreadi  h,abstaini  hsb-req-no-eggs,shortbreadi
In words: since there are no eggs baking a cake is as bad as baking shortbread
if this does indeed require eggs; it’s better not to bake anything; but most
preferred, of course, is baking shortbread when it in fact does not require
eggs. (We might call baking failed cakes simply as a waste of time, or go
further and imagine the expressions of the two friends when they bite into a
ﬂoury mess, as motivation for this utility ordering.)
So, how do we represent Pickles’ epistemic state as a decision problem
when he is unaware of shortbread as an option for baking? The obvious an-
swer to simply leave out the action “shortbread” in his representation of the
situation leaves us puzzling why, if Pickles is unaware of shortbread as an ac-
tion alternative, his decision problem would nevertheless distinguish the state
where the shortbread recipe speciﬁes eggs and where it does not. Rather, an
intuitively attractive representation of Pickles’ decision situation before becom-
ing aware of shortbread should only have one state: there is indeed no sub-
jective epistemic uncertainty about whether baking shortbread requires eggs.
But it is also not the case that we should simply leave out either one of the two
states in S in the representation of Pickles’ initial state. For, unlike in Bo’s
example, it does not seem defensible that Pickles holds any assumption about
whether shortbread requires eggs. His unawareness of baking shortbread as
an action shows in his behavior: he does not attempt to bake shortbread, does
not mention it etc. But his behavior, in particular his answer to Bob’s sugges-
tion, also shows that he is uncertain about the ingredients of shortbread after
becoming aware of this alternative action and before further pragmatic consid-
erations. Of course, we could assume that Pickles indeed ﬁrst has an implicit
belief (say: shortbread requires eggs), which he then loses as soon as he be-
comes aware of shortbread baking (leaving him uncertain whether shortbread
requires eggs). But this is at best a dirty hack. And it is also not necessary. In
fact, we should improve the modelling attempt of the previous section based
on this example in two respects: ﬁrstly, we should allow for unawareness of
relevant propositions that does not go along with an assumption, and, sec-
ondly, we should consider the states in a decision problem as conglomerates
of states (or possible worlds, as we will call them in the ﬁnal model) that the
agent does distinguish as potentially distinct.
To implement these amendments, we should ﬁrstly alter the deﬁnition of
an awareness state hU,v,Ai to allow v to be a partial function from U to truth-
values. This way we can represent which unmentionables an agent holds
assumptions about, as well as what the assumptions are. We should also de-
ﬁne a reasonable grouping mechanism that speciﬁes which states (or worlds)
of the background model together form a state in the decision problem under
an agent’s limited awareness. We will execute these ideas in section 2.2.4 after
motivating a further slight but necessary extension to the model in the next
section.14
2.2.3 Reﬁnement 2: Unawareness of outcomes
Example 3: Professor Branestawm. The scene is the banquet of this year’s
prestigious pepper conference.7 First to the buffet is Professor Branestawm,
with his friend Professor Calculus alongside. Branestawm is helping himself
to a big bowl of fruit salad, when Calculus is suddenly taken by fear:
calculus: Hey hold on a second! Won’t fruit salad set off one of
your allergies?
branestawm: [After some thought] Ah, no, I don’t think so. I haven’t
had an allergic reaction in months.
calculus: [Obviously still shaken] Well, we wouldn’t want to repeat the
disaster of last year, would we?
Not only would we not want to repeat the disaster of last year, we would
also not like to represent the possibility that Branestawm has an allergic re-
action as a state that Branestawm is uncertain about, in the same way that
Pickles in the previous example is uncertain about whether shortbread re-
quires eggs or not. Of course, this is technically possible. We could represent
Branestawm’s fully aware decision situation with states and actions
S = fallergy,no-allergyg
A = feat,abstaing.
But there is something decidedly odd about this representation: unlike in the
shortbread-recipe example of the previous section, in which states were dis-
tinguished by some describable parameter (whether shortbread takes eggs or
not), the only reason we can name for distinguishing states in the Branestawm
example is the outcome of performing the action “eat”. In other words, the only
reason for wanting to distinguish states is in order to distinguish different pos-
sible outcomes of one of our actions. We prefer instead to add these outcomes
explicitly, and to distinguish between two kinds of uncertainty: epistemic
uncertainty (about what is currently true in the world) and metaphysical
uncertainty about the outcome of inherently unpredictable events.8
Consequently, we take it to be much more natural to represent Brane-
stawm’s epistemic state under full awareness as a decision problem d that
distinguishes states before performance of actions from outcome states. In
particular, d has only one current state, two actions as before and three out-
come states (of which one is the current state, because it is the outcome of
“abstaining”, i.e. an empty action that does not change any relevant parame-
7The initial P most likely stands for ‘Pragmatics’.
8Of course, a determinist may wish to defend that the outcome of eating fruit salad is indeed ﬁxed
by the true state of affairs, just as a die-hard determinist might even argue that the outcome of a
fair coin toss is ﬁxed by the material facts just prior to the toss. Even so the point about naming
remains: no determinist will be able ﬁnd a name for the state leading to a coin-ﬂip landing heads
except for some variation on “pre-heads”. A determinist not willing to give these arguments the
right of way will probably also not be impressed by the argument from probabilistic indepen-
dence, so we will omit it, except to remark that it is also a claim about relative ease of modelling
rather than a statement of impossibility.15
ter):
S
now = fcurrentg
A = feat,abstaing
S
fut = fallergy,no-allergy,currentg
We will model the agent’s metaphysical uncertainty about the outcomes of
actions if performed in a given state as a function giving result distribu-
tions P : S
now  A ! D(S
fut) that maps each current state and action to
a probability distribution on the set of outcome states. (As is standard we
write D(X) for the set of all probability distributions on some set X.) In
Branestawm’s case, P would be a function that might reasonably look like
this:
hcurrent,abstaini 7!
8
> <
> :
allergy 7! 0
no-allergy 7! 0
current 7! 1
hcurrent,eati 7!
8
> <
> :
allergy 7! .001
no-allergy 7! .999
current 7! 0
On this model utilities can be deﬁned as a function from outcome states to
reals: u: Sfut ! R, and the utility of an action in a (current) state incorporates
an expectation calculation over all possible outcomes.
After these conceptual considerations, it is high time to take stock. We
still owe the reader a rigorous presentation of the ﬁnal model, in particular
(i) the background model, (ii) the awareness state and (iii) the ﬁltering mech-
anisms which produces a decision problem as a representation of the agent’s
epistemic state given the ﬁrst two components.
2.2.4 The ﬁnal model
As in the propositional case of Section 2.1, we will model an agent’s unaware-
ness via possible restrictions in the language that she would use to describe
her situation. Towards this end, we assume, as before, a set P of proposition
letters that capture the model-relevant distinctions before and after the agent
performs an action. Where before we had only one, we now consider two
sets of model-relevant possible worlds: a set W of present worlds before the
agent performs an action; and a set O (for ‘outcome worlds’) for the state of
the world after the agent performed an action. Here, W and O need not have
an empty intersection. Again, we associate with each world in w 2 W [ O a
valuation function vw : P ! f0,1g.9
We deﬁne the background model in terms of these worlds. This will keep
conceptually distinct worlds as the minimal modelling units in the background
9The division of worlds into current and future is natural in a decision-theoretic setting, where
we only consider ‘single-step’ actions. In a full planning setting the underlying model should be
some sort of extended temporal structure allowing for sequences of actions. This simpliﬁcation
will be harmless, so long as we are careful about distinguishing propositions that apply now or
in the future ‘by hand’.16
model from states as they occur in decision problems, as representations of the
agent’s transient subjective epistemic state, even when worlds and states are
to be identiﬁed, e.g. under an empty or otherwise trivial awareness state. A
background model captures the agent’s epistemic state under full awareness,
just as an information state did in the propositional case.
Definition 3: Background Models. A background model is a structure
with six components: hW,O,A,P,U,Pi where
 W and O are sets of current and outcome worlds;
 A is a set of actions;
 P 2 D(W) a probability distribution on current worlds;
 U : O ! R is a utility function giving the desirability of future worlds;
 P : W  A ! D(O) is a function giving result distributions: for
each w 2 W, a 2 A, and o 2 O Pw
a (o) gives the probabilities of outcome
o in state w by performing the action a.
Definition 4: Awareness States. An awareness state a is a triple hU,v,Ai
such that U  P is a set of unmentionables, v : U ! f0,1g is a (possibly
partial) valuation function on the set of unmentionables and A  A is a set
of actions. The unmentionables U are propositions that the agent is unaware
of; the assumptions v capture her implicit beliefs or assumptions (where an
agent need not hold assumptions about all unmentionables); the actions A are
likewise those she is unaware of.
Based on an agent’s awareness state we can deﬁne for future use the set
of worlds and outcomes that the agent entertains, i.e., the set of worlds or
outcomes not ruled out by her assumptions. Since according to our revised
notion of awareness states the assumption function v may be partial, the set of
entertained worlds or outcomes is no longer necessarily the set of worlds the
agent can distinguish given her awareness-language. In particular, she may
entertain possibilities, because she does not hold any assumption that would
rule them out, but still not be able to distinguish these possibilities in her lim-
ited vocabulary. (Think of Pickles in Example 2 who could not distinguish
a state where shortbread requires eggs from one where it does not, because
he is unaware of this distinction, but nevertheless held no assumptions about
the recipe for shortbread.) We therefore also deﬁne how an agent’s limited
awareness aggregates worlds into states: here we should consider as a single
state all those entertained worlds that agree on everything the agent can dis-
tinguish in her language. (The aggregation relation will deﬁne states in the
agent’s decision problem, see below.)
Definition 5: Entertaining and Aggregation. Let a = hU,v,Ai be an aware-
ness state. The worlds and outcomes that an agent in a entertains, i.e. the
worlds the agent does not rule out by an assumption, are the sets
Wa = fw 2 W ; v  vwg
Oa = fw 2 O ; v  vwg.17
Furthermore, the agent considers equivalent by reason of unawareness two worlds
w,w0 2 Wa, iff
vw(p) = vw0(p) for all p 2 P n U.
Obviously this is an equivalence relation on Wa, which we write a; the intu-
ition is however very different from that of the epistemic accessibility relation.
Two worlds are equivalent in this sense if the agent is not aware of anything
that would distinguish them. We will deﬁne the states in a decision problem
by aggregation using this relation: a state is simply an equivalence class
under a. (See below for the details.)
A background structure and an awareness state together give us the agent’s
subjective assessment of her situation. This includes limited awareness and
possible implicit beliefs. We capture this in the notion of a ﬁltered model.
Definition 6: Filtered Models. Given a background model M = hW,O,A,P,U,Pi
and an awareness state a = hU,v,Ai, the filtered model Ma is the structure
(of the same type as the background model) hW0,O0,A0,P0,U0,P0i where:
W0 = Wa
O0 = Oa
A0 = A n A
P0 = P(jWa)
U0 = UOa
P0 : W0  A0 ! D(O0) is such that P0(w,a) = Pw
a (jOa)
A ﬁltered model is the same kind of object as a background model; the
only direct effect of ﬁltering is to restrict attention to a sub-part of the back-
ground model. Both ﬁltered and background models represent an agent’s
epistemic state (possibly given awareness restrictions) in a decision-making
situation. These models are, in a sense, decision problems that just contain
more information than the classical variety. We can obviously read off a de-
cision problem in its classical guise from any such model, be that ﬁltered or
background. The only noteworthy elements in the following construction are
the formation of states by aggregation, and the deﬁnition of the utilities: here
we need to compute expected utilities where expectations are a mixture of
epistemic uncertainty (which world in which state am I in?) and metaphysi-
cal uncertainty (what might happen if I do such and such?).
Definition 7: Decision Problem. Let M be a background model hW,O,A,P,U,Pi
and a an awareness state hU,v,Ai. As above, call the elements of Ma (the ﬁl-
tered model) hW0,O0,A0,P0,U0,P0i. The agent’s decision problem d(Ma),
deﬁned on the ﬁltered model, is of the classical form


S, A, ˆ P,U

where:
S = W0/a
A = A0 = A n A
ˆ P(s) = å
w2s
P0(wjW0)
U(s,a) = å
w2s
P0(wjs) å
o2O0
P0(w,a,o)U0(o).18
In words: S is the set of equivalence classes on W0 given by the aggregation
relation; A is simply the actions being entertained; ˆ P is in fact the same ﬁltered
probability distribution but interpreted on states (that is, on sets of worlds);
and U gives the expected utility of a in s, under (epistemic) uncertainty about
which world w from s obtains but also (metaphysical uncertainty) about which
outcome o will result from doing a in w.
2.2.5 Example: Branestawm’s allergies come to awareness
An example will help make clear the formal model given in the last section.
Branestawm’s allergy case in Example 3 makes for a fairly simple case of
awareness dynamics involving decision problems. For the sake of a simple ex-
ample, we merely want to model Branestawm’s epistemic state before and af-
ter becoming aware of his allergies which might be set off by the fruit salad. In
order to do so we will have to specify a reasonable language (for propositions
and actions) restrictions of which will capture Branestawm’s initial unaware-
ness —indeed, the choice of a language thus becomes the initial modelling
step— and subsequently deﬁne a background model based on that language.
In Branestawm’s case, this is rather easy. We get by perfectly with just two
propositions, namely
“fruit”: Branestawm has enjoyed some fruit salad;
“allergy”: Branestawm’s allergies go rock-a-doodle.
So, let’s ﬁx that P = ffruit,allergyg. Similarly straight-forward is the
choice of actions as A = feat,abstaing containing actions representing Brane-
stawm eating or not eating fruit salad. Next, consider the worlds and out-
comes that should enter our background model. For the sake of simplicity,
we identify worlds and outcomes with their valuation functions. So we will
assume that W = fwg and O = fw,o1,o2g with the following valuation func-
tions and utilities:
fruit allergy U
w 0 0 0
o1 1 1 -10
o2 1 0 1
Finally, we specify Branestawm’s beliefs about the results of his actions if he
were fully aware of all propositions in the result distribution P as follows:
hw,abstaini 7! w
hw,eati 7!
(
o1 7! 0.001
o2 7! 0.999
That is, all the probability mass of Pw(abstain) is placed on w (abstaining
does not change either of the proposition parameters we are concerned with);
eating, on the other hand, leads to an allergic reaction (o1) with very low
probability, and otherwise to o2.
This completely speciﬁes Branestawm’s background model M. To fully
specify his epistemic state before Calculus makes him aware of his allergies we19
need to specify in addition an appropriate awareness state a0. In the case at
hand this is the triple:
U = fallergyg
v = fallergy 7! 0g
A = ?
This yields Branestawm’s limited awareness of the decision situation as a ﬁl-
tered model Ma0 = hW0,O0,A0,P0,U0,P0i which comes out as:
W0 = fwg
O0 = fw,o2g
A0 = A
P0 = P
U0 = UO0
P0 : W0  A0 ! D(O0) is such that
hw,abstaini 7! w
hw,eati 7! o2
In words, in epistemic state Ma0 Branestawm believes that eating fruit salad
will not trigger his allergies. This is modelled by the result distribution in
his ﬁltered model which assigns probability 1 to the outcome o2, the outcome
world where Branestawm does not have an allergic reaction.
The awareness dynamics in this example are fairly simple. Calculus’s
question simply has Branestawm become aware of the proposition “allergy”.
This is modelled by updating Branestawm’s awareness state a0 by removing
this proposition from the set of unmentionables and assumptions. The result-
ing awareness state a1 is trivial and the ﬁltered model Ma1 in this simple
example is the background model M itself.
One interesting point should be noted about this example: when Brane-
stawm becomes aware of the possibility of an allergic reaction, his beliefs ef-
fectively do not change. That is, he gains a 0.1% uncertainty about the matter,
but this is nowhere near enough to alter his choice of action. If Calculus knew
this in advance he would have no reason to bring up the possibility; how-
ever because he himself is aware of the possibility of an allergy but uncertain
about its relative probability, he feels compelled to mention the possibility.
Branestawm, on the other hand, we take to be expert in the matter of his own
allergies (at least when he is actively considering them). This is then an exam-
ple of a pragmatically well-motivated ‘awareness move’ by Calculus, which
nonetheless does not affect Branestawm’s actions. If we were to describe his
beliefs quantitatively, as the propositions his ﬁltered model gives overwhelm-
ing probability mass to, we would say that the awareness update does not
overturn his implicit belief due to assumption, but ratiﬁes it.10
This is, perhaps, the simplest possible example of awareness dynamics,
but, of course, there is much more to say about the changes in epistemic states
10Apart from this mention we stick to a purely qualitative view of beliefs, purely for convenience;
that is, in terms of the worlds given non-zero probability mass. The extension may be straightfor-
ward but we have not looked at it in detail.20
due to awareness and the interaction of awareness dynamics with factual in-
formation dynamics. Section 3 is devoted to these questions, but ﬁrst we owe
the reader a more explicit explanation of just where the convenient assump-
tions we have been making use of are supposed to come from.
2.3 Assumptions and associations
The ﬁrst thing to notice about assumptions is that not just anything goes. A
forgiving reader might not complain that we haven’t sufﬁciently motivated
Bo’s assumption that the keys are not in her car as a cognitive reality, but
should certainly object if in explaining a different scenario we had her un-
consciously assuming that they were in fact hiding in the sugar-jar. We have
appealed to intuitions of normality, without really making precise what we
mean by this. Clearly ‘normality’ is sensitive to the details of the decision-
making context; it is probably normal to assume the library is open when
checking the remaining to-do list for an almost-ﬁnished essay, and equally
reasonable to assume it is closed when plotting to break in at midnight for
some clandestine reading.
The library example is not chosen at random: law-like conditionals such as
“If she has an essay to write she studies late in the library” were used in a now
classic experiment in psychology of reasoning, the ‘suppression task’ [Byr89],
which shares many characteristics with the notions of awareness. The basic
observation is that subjects asked to accept the truth of the conditional (as a
premise in a logical argument) seem to implicitly hedge it with a normality
assumption: “If she has an essay to write (and nothing unexpected happens)
she studies late in the library”. [SL08] gives an explanation of the data in
terms of closed-world reasoning: Stenning and Van Lambalgen represent
the implicit hedge as a ‘dummy’ proposition which is assumed false if there
is no evidence that it is true. While the details do not concern us here (the
parallel with unawareness is incomplete, although provocative), the closed-
world reasoning is a perfect ﬁt for our notion of assumptions.
That is, if our examples are to be intuitively satisfactory, assumptions
should have a closed-world ﬂavour: unusual events do not occur and the
status quo is maintained, unless explicit reason is given to believe otherwise.
This formulation in turn suggests a loose probabilistic constraint on our
assumptions due to unawareness. That is, it should generally be the case
that the probability mass hidden by a particular assumption (an ‘unusual
event’) is relatively small compared to the probability mass on the worlds
being entertained (including, although not limited to, the ‘status quo’). In
other words, while becoming aware may qualitatively overturn an assump-
tion, it should generally replace certainty that p only with uncertainty, not
with near-certainty that :p.
We do not believe that this is a ‘hard’ semantic (or even pragmatic) con-
straint on acceptable states of awareness. However if we recall that our no-
tion of unawareness is linked to absent-mindedness and cognitive limitations
of attentiveness it seems that we should expect our cognitive apparatus (su-
perbly evolved as it seems to be for problem-solving) to be reasonably good
at prioritising attention, keeping focussed on the most probable and most
utility-relevant contingencies and letting only the marginal ones slip beneath
the surface.21
Taking this cognitive perspective also solves a formal problem that we have
so far managed to side-step by choice of easy examples. But consider again
the case of Bob and Pickles. If Bob tells Pickles he could bake shortbread
(making Pickles aware of a possible action), nothing in the formal setup we’ve
given so far explains how Pickles gets to entertain new outcomes as well. Still,
intuitively he should: when becoming aware of the action “baking shortbread”
he should also become aware of certain natural outcomes of that action.11
Although clearest in this case, the problem is not conﬁned to actions and
outcomes. The reality is that some possibilities are cognitively closely asso-
ciated, so that becoming aware of one may bring on awareness of the other.
However, very little formal or precise can be said in the present framework
about this process of association in its full complexity. Hearing a possibility
mentioned at least brings the possibility itself to awareness and mentioning
a possible action certainly calls to mind stereotypical outcomes of the action.
But beyond this we cannot say much more. That is why in this paper we’ve
been careful not to make associations do any explanatory work. However, for
the Pickles example discussed in detail in Section 4.1 we must at least rely
on the association between the action “bake shortbread” and the shortbread-
related propositions such as “shortbread has been baked”, “the shortbread
tastes awful (because of the lack of eggs)” and so on.
As in the case of assumptions, we may gesture at the adaptive nature of
our cognitive capabilities in support of the idea that the right associations
will spring to mind when they are needed. Apart from the formal deﬁnition
of bringing to awareness propositions that are explicitly mentioned, however,
the details of this association process must remain somewhat vague. In the
following section we assume a mechanism giving associations and deﬁne the
dynamic updates to awareness states it gives rise to, and the resulting updates
to ﬁltered information states and decision problems. As before, the strength
of the account is that relatively simple changes in awareness can give rise to
radical belief changes through the ﬁltering process.
3 Information dynamics under awareness
The previous section laid out two closely related formal models for represent-
ing a single agent’s unawareness, once for a mere propositional setting and
once for a richer decision-theoretic structure. The models contained the ba-
sic ingredients for awareness dynamics: removing unmentionables from and
adding actions to awareness states. We have not yet addressed the relation
between awareness updates and the uptake of factual informative. This is
what we will do presently. Again we proceed in stages from simple to com-
plex, starting with the propositional case where we can focus on the main
ideas that then carry over to the structurally more complex case of decision
problems under growing awareness.
11The formal distinction between actions and propositions is of course a theoretical ﬁction which
a shift to a ﬁrst-order model (with possibilities of deﬁning unawareness of terms such as “short-
bread” be that in descriptions of actions or states of affairs) could alleviate. A ﬁrst-order unaware-
ness model has recently come on the market [BC07] however it’s not yet clear how to combine
this approach with implicit beliefs based on (possibly false) assumptions.22
3.1 The propositional case
There are two fundamental ideas to the treatment of information dynamics
under awareness. Firstly, we have already argued in the introduction, in par-
ticular in the slogan “Awareness is easily overturned”, that unawareness from
inattentiveness is lifted spontaneously whenever agents process linguistic in-
formation that contains mention of an unaware contingency. That is why
we will assume that an agent who processes an utterance of some natural
language sentence f, be that for information uptake or anything else, will
involuntarily become aware of all linguistic elements (proposition letters and
actions) used in f (or rather: a formal representation thereof in propositional
logic) even before she can engage in any further processing.
A second key feature of information dynamics under unawareness is that
information uptake can only take place, so to speak, within the window of
awareness: more formally speaking, if, for the propositional case, an agent in
the epistemic state hs,ai is aware of all proposition letters in (the formula)
f, an informative update with the (propositional) information in f will be an
update on the ﬁltered state sa only (that is, only worlds being entertained
are eliminated, not worlds from the background information set that are ex-
cluded by assumptions). This is fairly natural once appreciated: an agent who
learns factual information can process this information only in the light of her
(possibly limited) awareness. (Things become more complicated when the
awareness state itself changes, a complication taken up in Section 3.3.)
These considerations lead to the following treatment of information up-
dates for the propositional case. We will write hs,ai[f] for updating an epis-
temic state hs,ai with a propositional formula f. This update can be consid-
ered a sequential update ﬁrst of the awareness state, for which we will write
a[f], and subsequently an update of s with f under the agent’s updated
awareness a[f]. If f is a propositional formula (representing an utterance),
write P(f) for the proposition letters occurring in f and [[f]] for the set of
worlds where f is true. Then we deﬁne propositional update with awareness
as follows:
Definition 8: Epistemic update with (propositional) awareness. Let hs0,a0i
be an epistemic state. Then s0  W is an information set (the worlds not
excluded by the agent’s information) and a0 is as always an awareness state.
Let f be an utterance. Then
hs0,a0i[f]
def = hs1,a1i
where a1 = a0[f] is given by
hU,vi[f]
def = hUn P(f),v(Un P(f))i,
and s1 is given by
s0 n ((s0a1) \ [[:f]]).
For emphasis: updating s0 to s1 uses the new awareness state a1, rather
than the old one; ﬁrst we make all proposition letters in f mentionable and
then we eliminate all entertainable worlds that are incompatible with f.23
3.2 Updates for decision problems
The main features of information dynamics under awareness carry over from
the basic propositional case to the richer decision-theoretic models fairly straight-
forwardly. An epistemic state is now the pair hM,ai where M is a back-
ground model and a is an awareness state. Updating an epistemic state with
(a formal representation of) an utterance f proceeds analogously to the propo-
sitional case by ﬁrst making the agent aware of all linguistic elements featured
in f, where this might now include actions as well, and subsequently updating
the background model through ‘the awareness window’ of the ﬁltered model
Ma[f] with the information [[f]]. This boils down to eliminating from the
background model all worlds and outcomes where f is not true that are visi-
ble in the awareness window after the agent became aware of all contingencies
mentioned in f. Let A(f) be all the actions mentioned in f and deﬁne:
Definition 9: Epistemic update with (decision-theoretic) awareness. Let
hM0,a0i be the epistemic state of some agent, where now a0 = hU,v,Ai.
Let f be an utterance. Then
hM0,a0i[f]
def = hM1,a1i
where a1 = a0[f] is given by
hU,v,Ai[f]
def = hUn P(f),v(Un P(f)),An A(f)i,
and M1 is derived from M0 = hW,O,A,P,U,Pi (indices omitted for read-
ability) as follows:12
W1 = W n (Wa1 \ [[:f]]) (but see footnote 12)
O1 = O n (Oa1 \ [[:f]]) (but see again footnote 12)
A1 = A
P1 = P(jW1)
U1 = UO1
P1 : W1  A1 ! D(O1) is such that P1(w,a) = Pw
a (jO1)
For clarity: the only non-trivial updates of the background model are the
elimination of worlds and outcomes, which is but exactly the same procedure
as in the propositional case. The restrictions to probabilities and utilities are
simply required to keep the structure well-deﬁned.13
12Note that we have to be a little careful interpreting the tense of the expression f correctly: updat-
ing with the (true) information “Branestawm has not eaten any fruit salad” should not remove
outcomes in which he does. On the other hand if his doctor declares “Branestawm will not suffer
from an allergy”, it is exactly the outcome worlds that should be removed. If the background
model were a fully-ﬂedged temporal model this difﬁculty would be avoided, but the construc-
tion of a decision problem would become much more complex. We prefer to stick to the simpler
approximation, and apply common sense to the updates.
13A different route could also be taken: instead of removing worlds from the information set
entirely, simply adjusting their degree of credence, assigned by P, to zero. Which is appropriate
depends on whether you think possibilities ruled out by information are still entertained or not,
which might even vary depending on the application under consideration.24
3.3 Old information in the light of new awareness
The perhaps most fundamental idea behind out treatment of updates with
factual information by agents with limited awareness is that factual informa-
tion can only be evaluated (at the time it is observed) within the ‘window of
awareness’ of the agent. But that may mean that assumptions can block the
elimination of worlds which, when the implicit belief is given up by grow-
ing awareness, the agent might or might not want to rule out as well. Here
is a simple example to illustrate the sequential interaction of awareness and
information updates.
Suppose for simplicity that P = fp,qg and that our agent is unaware of
p, assuming it to be true, and aware of q but uncertain about it; this gives
us four possible worlds W = fpq, pq, pq, pqg (identifying them sloppily with
their valuations). Then s0a0 = fpq, pqg; if the agent now learns that q is true,
she will erase the world pq and her information set will become (according to
the deﬁnitions we’ve given) s1 = fpq, pq,qpg.
Now this means that within her awareness window she has come to believe
q, because s1a0 = fpqg; this is an explicit belief by our deﬁnition, but, sur-
prisingly, one that is not necessarily stable under awareness updates, because
when the agent becomes aware of her implicit assumption about p, a mere
awareness update that removes p from the set of unmentionables brings with
it the world pq which has not been ruled out by the previous information
update. So, taken together, when an agent processes factual information her
implicit beliefs might in fact block correct information uptake. In order to
rule out worlds that have not been ruled out by an informative update, be-
cause these worlds were hidden behind an implicit belief, the agent has to, in
our system, reprocess or reconsider the previous factual information in the light
of her extended awareness.
The reader’s response at this point may be: “But then you have deﬁned
information updates in the wrong way.” Indeed, it is tempting to give up the
idea that information is processed only in the light of awareness and instead
assume that information percolates, perhaps secretly, all the way up through
to the background model. This would save us quite some trouble, not only in
the deﬁnition of information uptake, but also in dispensing with the “repro-
cessing” of factual information.
However there is an important distinction between observing that q holds
and merely hearing reported that q holds, and one that turns on unawareness.
If our agent assumes p holds, she does not think to check whether a report
of q is conditional on this assumption or not. The speaker, in turn, might
hold the same assumption and might themselves not be willing to commit
to the truth of q if they are made aware of p. The point is clearest in the
case of lawlike conditionals discussed brieﬂy in Section 2.3. If I hear “If she
has an essay to write she will study late in the library” and I am assuming
the library is open, it is simply unclear whether the speaker makes the same
assumption or is trying to tell me something stronger (that the student is so
fanatical she will ﬁnd a way to sneak in anyway, for instance). Were this not
a case of unawareness I could always ask the speaker for clariﬁcation, but
the distinction hinges on possibilities I am not yet entertaining; it is only in
retrospect, when they have been brought to my attention, that I realise the
potential ambiguity of the speaker’s intent.25
This complicates the picture of epistemic update in conversation consid-
erably. Rather than simply carrying around an epistemic state, agents must
carry at least a rough memory of the updates that brought them to that state,
in order to be able to reinterrogate that memory in the light of new possibil-
ities. Of course this is a more realistic picture of real conversation, but it is a
signiﬁcantly less tractable one. However it raises one very interesting possi-
bility: that a speaker might come to repudiate a statement she has previously
accepted, or even made herself, without having in the strict sense learned
anything new in the interim.
In general, these considerations play on the dynamics of awareness in con-
versation and open up the possibility for quite complicated pragmatic rea-
soning of various sorts. In the next section we give a concrete example, in
(perhaps excruciating) detail, in order to show the power of the formal ma-
chinery we have deﬁned.
4 Awareness dynamics, decisions, and pragmatics
So far we have seen how limited awareness and awareness growth can inﬂu-
ence a single agent’s decision to act. Our conjecture in this paper is that un-
awareness from inattentiveness is fairly natural and wide-spread. It is there-
fore not surprising to ﬁnd that the notion of awareness also plays a role in
a variety of pragmatic phenomena that arise in conversation. In this section
we will revisit the introductory Example 2 where Bob, an expert baker, makes
his friend Pickles deliberately aware of a contingency that he had overlooked.
Adding to the brief informal discussion in Section 1, we will spell out formally
the kind of pragmatic reasoning that revolves around the concept of aware-
ness in this little dialogue. (We do not believe that this simple example covers
all, or even necessarily the most important, aspects of pragmatic reasoning
about awareness in decision-relevant conversations. We merely believe that
this simple example is indicative enough of the kind of reasoning we have in
mind, and its possible formalisation.)
4.1 Bob & Pickles revisited
In the Pickles dialogue (Example 2) we would like to model Pickles becoming
aware of baking shortbread as a possible action. We will ﬁrst spell out the
background model in order to discuss a simple awareness update. Towards
this end, let’s ﬁrst of all ﬁx what Pickles’ language should be able to distin-
guish when he is fully aware of all model-relevant contingencies. With quite
some redundancy, we use the following set of proposition letters P:
“eggs”: the recipe for shortbread requires eggs;
“yum-cake”: Pickles has baked a tasty cake;
“yuck-cake”: Pickles has baked a disgusting cake;
“yum-sb”: Pickles has baked tasty shortbread;
“yuck-sb”: Pickles has baked a disgusting cake.
Given these propositions we should distinguish in Pickles’ background model
certain worlds and outcomes, according to their associated valuation functions
based on P. But it should be clear that we do not have to consider all possible26
valuations, because two assumptions rule out quite a number of combinations:
ﬁrstly, we assume that Pickles can only bake one item, so that there will be no
world where Pickles has baked both a cake and shortbread; secondly, certain
natural meaning postulates apply, (there can be no tasty cake if no cake has
been baked, and so on).
Again for simplicity we identify worlds and outcomes with their associ-
ated valuation functions; the background model M for Pickles’ case contains
worlds W = fw1,w2g and outcomes O = fw1,w2,o1,...,o4g with the fol-
lowing valuations and utilities (recall that “egg” means that the recipe for
shortbread requires eggs; it is common knowledge that Pickles has no eggs so
we don’t bother including any uncertainty about that fact):
egg yum-cake yuck-cake yum-sb yuck-sb U
w1 0 0 0 0 0 0
w2 1 0 0 0 0 0
o1 0 0 1 0 0 -1
o2 1 0 1 0 0 -1
o3 0 0 0 1 0 1
o4 1 0 0 0 1 -1
The actions Pickles is aware of in the limit are baking cake, baking shortbread
and abstaining from all baking:
A = fcake,sb,abstaing.
Pickles’ beliefs about the true state of affairs are represented in his probability
distribution P. We leave this parametrized for the sake of discussion below
and set P(egg) = p. In turn, Pickles’ beliefs about the outcomes of his actions
are represented in the result distribution P as follows (all probability distri-
butions put probability mass 1 on exactly one outcome in this example, so we
only need to specify which outcome that is):
hwi,abstaini 7! wi
hwi,cakei 7! oi
hw1,sbi 7! o3
hw2,sbi 7! o4.
So far for Pickles’ epistemic state under full awareness. Let’s now model
his unawareness of the action “sb” and investigate in more detail the aware-
ness update and its impact on Pickles’ decision problem. Since Pickles is
unaware of the action “sb” his initial unawareness state a0 will have record
this fact: A = fsbg. But also, Pickles is unaware of shortbread-related propo-
sitions, so his set of unmentionables U is feggs,yum-sb,yuck-sbg. Since, as
we argued above, Pickles does not have any implicit beliefs about any of these,
his assumptions v are a trivial (empty) valuation function. For perspicuity: a0
is given by
U = feggs,yum-sb,yuck-sbg
v = ?
A = fsbg.27
When Bob mentions shortbread, we assume that Pickles becomes aware
not only of the action “sb”, but also of the naturally associated propositions,
that is, the shortbread-related propositions “yum-sb” and “yuck-sb”. The
result of this awareness update is the trivial awareness state a1 (full awareness
and no assumptions): after Bob’s remark about shortbread, Pickles represents
his decision problem as Ma1 which is identical to M.
But the decision problem represented in M has Pickles uncertain whether
the recipe for shortbread contains eggs of not. This is, for the time being,
how it should be. We have assumed that he himself does not know and
that his initial unawareness of shortbread only concealed this true uncertainty.
This uncertainty, however, can be overturned by a pragmatic inference that
crucially relies on the idea that Bob, an expert baker who knows whether
shortbread requires eggs, is cooperative much in the sense of [Gri89] and —
enter awareness— has ostensibly made Pickles aware of shortbread. Here is a
semi-formal account of this pragmatic reasoning.
Let’s ﬁrst of all ask ourselves what Pickles would do in the initial decision
problem when he was still unaware of shortbread. Since eggs are unavailable
baking a cake would seem stupid. In formal terms it has an expected utility of
-1 in his decision problem d0 = d(Ma0), where expected utility of an action
(in a classical decision problem d) is deﬁned as:
EUd(a)
def = å
s2S
P(s)  U(s,a)
In contrast, abstaining from all baking has expected utility 0, so that in d0 this
is clearly the preferred option. But now compare this with Pickles’ decision
problem under full awareness, d1. Clearly baking a cake and abstaining from
baking altogether have the same expected utilities. But we have a new player
in the race: baking shortbread. The expected utility of baking shortbread
under full awareness is:
EUd1(sb) =  1 p + 1 (1  p) = 1  2p
This means that under full awareness baking shortbread will be preferred
to abstaining from baking (with expected utility 0) iff p < 0.5. In other
words, barring pragmatic considerations Pickles will bake shortbread only if
he thinks it is more likely that the recipe for shortbread does not require eggs.
(Naturally the speciﬁc utilities chosen don’t matter for the general point that
there is some threshold beyond which p is high enough to justify baking.) But
even if his subjective probability favored the possibility that shortbread does
require eggs (p > 0.5) he could still revise these beliefs based on the following
pragmatic reasoning: if Bob knows that Pickles faces the decision problem in
question (including unawareness of shortbread) and if furthermore Bob is also
helpful and cooperative, then his conversational move (deliberately bringing
shortbread to awareness) can only be motivated if p < 0.5, for otherwise it
would be futile, or lead him to choose an even worse action. If furthermore
Bob is an expert baker who knows for sure whether w1 or w2 is the true state
of affairs, Pickles is safe in concluding that the true state of affairs is w1.28
4.2 Decision-theoretic relevance
This intuitive formulation points towards the assumption of relevance as
driving Pickles’ inference. Pickles must be able to explain Bob’s question
as relevant to the purposes of the conversation, otherwise he would have to
conclude that Bob was not being cooperative. If those purposes are, roughly,
getting something tasty cooked, it’s hard to imagine how Bob could have
relevantly intended his question as a literal request for information. However
if it is given the natural interpretation of deliberately and ostensibly bringing
a possibility to awareness, the prospect looks much better.
If our promise of a formal solution is to be fulﬁlled, though, we need a for-
mal notion of relevance that is appropriate for the decision-theoretic setting.
As it happens one already exists for purely informational updates, which we
can adapt with very minor changes to the current setting. The measure in
question is called the value of sample information (we use a variant of
that deﬁned in [RS61]).
The intuition is as follows: the relevance of (true) information in a decision
problem can be measured as the change in the agent’s expected utility with
the information, compared to without it. If we assume the agent is a utility
maximiser, they will choose one of the actions that appear best (in terms of
expected utility) according to their information; comparing the actual value
(given the new information) of these apparent best-action choices with the
true best-action payoffs (again given the new information) gives the amount
the agent believes her fortunes have improved in light of the information.
Stated negatively, information that does not cause the agent to change her
mind about her best action is irrelevant.14
We will ﬁrst deﬁne the value of sample information for factual information
uptake not involving expanding awareness. Towards this end, extend this
deﬁnition of expected utility of an action in a (classical) decision problem to a
set B  A of actions by taking the average (we will use this for the agent’s set
of perceived best actions):
EUd(B)
def =
1
jBj å
a2B
EUd(a).
We write BA(d) for the set of actions with maximal expected utility in d:
BA(d)
def = fa 2 A ; 8a0 2 A: EUd(a0)  EUd(a)g.
Now suppose that d is a decision problem representing the actual state of
affairs (metaphysical uncertainty may still keep this nontrivial), while g is the
agent’s conception of the decision problem she faces (limited by unawareness
and complicated by epistemic uncertainty as usual). Then EUd(BA(g)) is
perfectly well-deﬁned (so long as d and g are ‘compatible’ in the obvious
ways) and gives the actual expected utility of the actions the agent believes
are best.
Now let d represent some concrete decision problem, and write d[f] for the
same problem updated with some (true) factual information f that does not
14This can easily be rejected as overly simplistic, since information making an agent more certain
of a choice she has made can intuitively be highly relevant. We don’t represent anywhere the
higher-order notions of uncertainty that doing this intuition justice would require, however we
also feel that this omission is harmless for the paradigm cases of unawareness that we treat.29
involve awareness updates. The value of sample information f in the original
decision problem d, written VSId(f), is given by
VSId(f)
def = EUd[f](BA(d[f]))   EUd[f](BA(d)).
That is, we compare the actual expected utilities (given the information f) of
two sets of actions: those the agent considers best before she learns f, and
those she prefers after she learns f.
One convenient feature of this deﬁnition is that information never has neg-
ative value. Another simple point to note is that information has strictly pos-
itive value only if it reveals some apparently optimal action to not in fact be
so; that is, if it removes something from the set of best actions. (To see this,
consider the alternatives: (i) the set of best actions stays the same, in which its
value doesn’t change, or (ii) something is added to the set, in which case the
new action must have the same expected value as the previous elements —or
they would be removed— so the average does not change.)
Turning now to awareness dynamics, we will take over this deﬁnition ex-
actly as it stands, except for the update: we will consider also the value of
changes to an epistemic state by updating awareness, rather than by incorpo-
rating information. The only difference, then, is in the deﬁnition of expected
utility: rather than take this relative to a decision problem we deﬁne it relative
to a ﬁltered information state. If hM,ai is a decision-theoretic epistemic state
(a background model and awareness state) then we deﬁne the expected utility
EUhM,ai(a) simply by taking EUd(a) where d is the classical decision problem
‘read off’ from Ma according to Deﬁnition 7; the deﬁnition of “BA()” is ex-
tended in the same way. Entirely analogous to the deﬁnition given above, we
can write EUhM,ai[f](BA(hM,ai)) for the consequences (judged in terms of
awareness of f) of the actions the agent considered best before f was brought
to her attention.
We might dub the new deﬁnition the “Value of Epistemic Change”; not
that it is formally so different from the old, but the supporting intuitions
certainly are. We are no longer dealing simply with sample information (intu-
itively obtained by direct observation) but with changes to the epistemic state
of the agent herself (most likely obtained from conversation), albeit ones that
we will assume bring her asymptotically closer to the truth. While her up-
dated state may be closer to reality (if she learns true information or becomes
aware of contingencies she was unwarrantedly excluding) it may still be far
from the whole truth. These necessary caveats given, here is the deﬁnition:
VEChM,ai(f)
def = EUhM,ai[f](BA(hM,ai[f]))   EUhM,ai[f](BA(hM,ai)).
4.3 Bob & Pickles made formal (at last)
Armed with this deﬁnition we can at last formalise the pragmatic reason-
ing we attribute to Pickles when he concludes that the recipe for shortbread
should not require eggs. The formalisation rests on the assumption that al-
though Pickles does not know which of the two possible worlds is actual (w1
in which shortbread does not require eggs, or w2 in which it does) he knows
that Bob the Baker does know which world obtains.30
Pickles began in state hs0,a0i, and Bob’s suggestion has brought him (be-
fore any pragmatic reasoning takes place) to hs0,a0i[f] = hs0,a1i (we’ll as-
sume that whatever logical form f takes, (a) it confers no information directly
—does not eliminate worlds or change probabilities— and (b) it mentions
shortbread and thus induces the awareness updates we need).
Pickles can now imagine two possibilities for the decision problem as Bob
sees it: if w1 is the actual world, Bob sees hs0[:egg],a1i (that is, the same
decision problem Pickles does but updated with the information that the eggs
aren’t needed) or hs0[egg],a1i. Call the ﬁrst possibility d1 and the second d2
(conﬂating the epistemic state with the corresponding decision problem, since
these states occur with full awareness anyway).
Now Pickles can compute the value of his epistemic change, if each of
these possibilities is the actual one:
VECd1(f) = EUd1(BA(hs0,a0i[f]))   EUd1(BA(hs0,a0i))
and likewise for the alternative d2. This computation rests, of course, on the
decision of best action Pickles would take. Let’s assume the worst: he’s uncer-
tain enough about the recipe that he’s unwilling to take the risk, and prefers
to abstain from cooking. Then BA(hs0,a0i) = fabsg.
But then VECd1(f) = VECd2(f) = 0: for before Bob made his suggestion,
Pickles had already decided not to cook anything.
If Pickles is to make sense of Bob’s suggestion as relevant, he will have
to conclude that it communicates something beyond its ostensive awareness
update. It’s easy to see that this extra content, if assumed to be true, could
only be “:eggs” if w1 is the actual world, and “eggs” if w2 is actual. So let’s
compare these possibilities:
VECd1(f;:eggs) VECd2(f;eggs)
= EUd1(BA(hs0,a0i[f;:eggs])) = EUd2(BA(hs0,a0i[f;eggs]))
  EUd1(BA(hs0,a0i))   EUd2(BA(hs0,a0i))
= EUd1(sb)   EUd1(abstain) = EUd2(abstain)   EUd2(abstain)
= 1 = 0
That is, correctly assuming shortbread to not require eggs would lead Pickles
to a positive expected utility gain, while correctly assuming that it does require
eggs leads to no gain at all. Since Bob knows which of d1 and d2 actually
obtains and since his update (by the relevance requirement) should lead to a
positive expected value change, he must be in d1 and have intended to convey
“:eggs”.15
The reader might be forgiven for thinking that this is making a very com-
plicated mountain out of a very simple molehill. We give the derivation in
all its considerable detail in order to make clear that this framework fulﬁlls
the promises we have made on its behalf: a fully formalised representation
of awareness-related relevance reasoning can be represented. That is not to
15In fact something stronger can be said: if d0 is the actual state of affairs (and Bob knows this)
then no action (that Pickles is aware of) does better than the one he has already chosen, so no
reasoning he can conceive of would make Bob’s suggestion relevant. This reasoning comes closer
to the intuitively natural question “If you know shortbread needs eggs and we don’t have any,
why would you bring it up at all?”31
say that the story we have given for Bob and Pickles necessarily covers all the
possibilities, and it’s also not to claim that the numerical details of this sort of
reasoning are perspicuous for the modeller. We would be remiss in pushing
the structural capabilities of the system, however, without substantiating our
claims with at least one fully worked-out example.
5 Related work
We have tried to develop a formal notion of unawareness from inattentiveness
in this paper and also to show that such a notion can be useful for accounts
of natural language meaning. In other words, the purpose of this paper is
explicitly a dual one: to propose a thoroughly grounded and explicit model
of a sort of unawareness that has not yet been closely investigated in the
rational choice literature, and also to make linguists aware of the possibility
of awareness as a signiﬁcant feature of semantics and pragmatics (to run the
awareness ﬂag up the mast, as it were). This section situates our contribution
with respect to current models of unawareness and to linguistic theory; we
show the contribution of our work and give some suggestions for further
applications in linguistics.
5.1 Formal awareness models
The classical reference for the notion of unawareness is [FH88], whose origi-
nal motivation was developing inference systems that did not suffer from the
problem of logical omniscience (that an agent knows all logical consequences
of the facts that she knows). Fagin and Halpern point out that there are several
distinct reasons to want to do away with logical omniscience such as ‘strict’
unawareness of possibilities, computational limitations and resource bounds,
lack of knowledge of rules of inference, or issues of attention and focus. Differ-
ent modelling choices result from different conceptualizations of unawareness
which in turn depend on the intended application of the unawareness model.
This is then also the primary difference between the models presented
here and the majority of unawareness models presented in rational choice
theory that have sprouted recently.16 In rational choice theory, apart from
a general interest in modelling reasoning about this notion (see for instance
[DLR98; Hal01; HMS06; HMS08a; MR94; MR99]) and in including unaware-
ness into game theoretic solution concepts (see for instance [Fei04; Fei05;
HR06; HMS07; Ozb07]), most applications have focused on reanalyzing in the
light of possible unawareness certain fairly strong game-theoretic predictions
about rational behavior: [Fei04], for instance, shows how the possibility of un-
awareness helps establish cooperation as a rational solution in the prisoners
dilemma; [HMS06] shows how possible unawareness has otherwise rational
agents wholeheartedly engage in speculative trade despite the well-known
class of “No-Trade Theorems” (for example [MS82]).17
16The online unawareness bibliography maintained by Burkhard Schipper (http://www.econ.
ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/unaw.htm) is a good starting point for readers interested in
exploring the rational choice literature further.
17Very roughly, a “No-Trade Theorem” shows that speculative trade should never take place. For
an intuitive basis to this theorem, imagine you are bargaining at a street market for some item32
The source of unawareness that we have been concerned with in this paper
is inattentiveness. This is because we believe that it is this kind of unaware-
ness that plays a key role in certain aspects of conversation (see also the next
section). The crucial feature of unawareness from inattentiveness is the ease
with which it is overturned. To appreciate the difference between unaware-
ness from inattentiveness and that resulting from a lack of conceptual grasp,
suppose a teenager is presenting a poorly-reasoned argument in favour of un-
protected sex, and you mention the possibility of aids; the instant awareness
update along the lines we have described is easy to imagine. Treating un-
awareness from lack of conceptual grasp is like imagining the same conversa-
tion as if it it were held in the ’70s, when the disease was unidentiﬁed and the
acronym not yet invented: the new possibility being brought to painful aware-
ness was not forgotten but simply had not yet been imagined. It should be
clear that where linguistic generalizations about extending awareness through
dialogue are concerned it is the former, not the latter type of awareness dy-
namics that we should focus on. This is then the main difference in conceptual
interpretation of unawareness between our models and the collection of mod-
els entertained in economic theory. The notional difference further cashes out
in two major differences in the modeling.
The ﬁrst difference between our linguistically-inspired models and the
ones studied for economic applications is that the latter do not consider and
spell out assumptions. Recall that in introducing the notion of assumptions
as implicit beliefs, we referred to the intuition that in the initial example un-
aware Bo Peep behaves as if she believes the keys are not in the car. Interest-
ingly, it seems to us that the motivation for explicit modelling of assumptions
of agents is not exclusively linguistic. For instance, when Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper seek to explain how unawareness overturns the “No-Trade Theo-
rem” [HMS07], they also need to assume (implicitly) a particular “as-if” be-
havior of unaware sellers and buyers, namely behavior as if certain favorable
or unfavorable contingencies were believed to be true or false. We suggest
that the notion of an assumption might be an interesting enrichment of exist-
ing unawareness models.
The second major difference between the two systems (or system types)
also stems from our goal to apply an unawareness model to (generalizations
about) cooperative conversation. For this end, we are interested in describ-
ing systematically the effects of awareness updates on decision problems,
which requires specifying numerical probabilities and utilities for the newly-
introduced possibilities. The main idea to achieve this end is ﬁltering through
an awareness state.18 The problem of changing awareness has also been ad-
dressed, typically in game-theoretic settings where it is natural to assume that
observing a player make a move you were unaware they could make over-
turns this unawareness. [HMS08b] gives a game-theoretic model and a vari-
of jewellery; you offer what you consider an outrageously low price, and the seller immediately
spits in his palm, shakes your hand and shouts “Done!”. Your immediate thought is likely to
be “If he’s so happy with the deal, I’ve been had”, and if given the choice you would prefer to
revoke the offer. The unawareness perspective suggests how a more careful buyer and seller can
still both go away convinced that they have struck an advantageous deal: you are unaware that
the necklace is stolen and thus a risky purchase, and the seller is unaware that you are leaving
the country in the morning and thus have nothing to fear.
18We introduced this approach in [FJ07], in a preliminary and in many ways unsatisfactory model
which nonetheless contains the seeds of the present account.33
ant of rationalizability for games with possibly unaware players, and [Fei04;
Fei05; HR06] have taken similar equilibrium-based approaches. However, the
emphasis in these efforts is on non-cooperative game theory, whose solution
concepts do not, strictly speaking, supply vanilla awareness updates irrespec-
tive of rationality considerations. The demands of linguistic pragmatics, based
as it is on a fundamentally cooperative notion of interaction, are quite differ-
ent: we would like to pin down pure awareness dynamics ﬁrst and show how
pragmatic reasoning con take place on top of it.
Seen in this light, the model of [Ozb07] deserves special mention. Ozbay
gives in a non-cooperative setting a signalling games model with an equilib-
rium reﬁnement somewhat similar to our notion of relevance as VSI or VEC.
In the model an aware sender can make an unaware receiver aware of certain
contingencies by her choice of signal, but the beliefs the receiver adopts when
becoming aware are not determined, but subject to strategic considerations.
Ozbay offers a reﬁned equilibrium notion according to which the receiver
should adopt beliefs under extended awareness that prompt him to choose a
different action from the one that he had chosen under his initial unawareness.
While this kind of constraint on belief formation seems to be what pragmatic
reasoning based on a notion of relevance as VSI or VEC provides, it is unclear
whether this should apply in all cases of (possibly) conﬂicting interests. It
should, to our mind, apply for the cooperative case, and we have spelled out
this kind of reasoning based on the example of Bob and Pickles.
In short, although our work is based on the standard models in the ratio-
nal choice literature, our notion of unawareness is not quite the same. The
linguistic application, and in particular the structural requirements imposed
by decision-problem representations, have led us to develope a signiﬁcantly
different model based on similar, but subtly different, intuitions.
5.2 Unawareness in linguistics
Turning to the linguistic literature, the picture is quite different. The no-
tions and intuitions have apparently been present since the work of Lewis,
and probably before, but have never been treated as a distinct phenomenon
amenable to a uniﬁed formal treatment.
In his seminal paper [Lew79], David Lewis gave a unifying account of a
wide range of accommodation effects in terms of an evolving “conversational
score”. Awareness effects as we have described them make a somewhat un-
comfortable ﬁt with picture, since unawareness updates (if we are correct)
proceed not by accommodation but by something akin to inherent salience or
attention-focussing effects. However one class of observations given by Lewis
ﬁts the awareness story very comfortably: his Example 6, on relative modality.
Lewis is concerned here with modals such as “can” and “must”, and their
apparent restriction, in normal usage, to a subset of all ‘metaphysical’ possi-
bilities. There is a large literature on this subject, of course, but certain features
recur again and again: a restricted set of possibilities that are ‘in play’ at any
given moment, against which modal statements should be evaluated, and the
possibility to add hitherto unconsidered possibilities into this set as a conver-
sation progresses.
The similarity to the unawareness picture is clear, so we should say some-
thing instead about the differences. It might be thought that our ‘worlds34
being entertained’ correspond directly to a Stalnakerian context set [Sta78]:
the possibilities not ruled out by presuppositions in force. However there is
a crucial difference between our assumptions and the presuppositions that
this approach would conﬂate them with: assumption is typically something
the agent would repudiate if she were made aware of it. This is implicit in
our slogan “Unawareness is easily overturned”: it is only when overturning
unawareness also overturns an implicit belief (that is, when an assumption is
given up as unfounded) that the epistemic update is as it were visible to the
observer, since an awareness update that simply ratiﬁes an implicit belief does
not result in a change of behaviour.
Nevertheless the notions of assumption and presupposition are closely
linked, and the exact relation between them remains a problem for further
study. It seems, for instance, that assumptions can sometimes be ‘converted
into’ presuppositions. Suppose you make a na¨ ıve statement due to unaware-
ness of some contingency p. I am aware of p, and see that you seem to have
neglected it, but even so I agree with your statement (suppose for example
that I explicitly assign very low probability to p). If I choose not to object, it
seems that all assertions in our further conversation are contingent on p being
false, but in two quite different ways: we might say that you are assuming,
while I am presupposing. Whether this is in fact the right distinction is unclear
(the possibility of uncertainty about the awareness basis from which a speaker
makes assertions complicates matters), but certainly the issue deserves further
investigation.
Another difference to the standard approach is the inadvertency of an
awareness update: the agent who undergoes such an update cannot choose
rather to remain unaware, and no pragmatic reasoning can undo the imme-
diate effects it produces. An interesting topic for further research is the in-
terplay between such automatic updates and the explicit negotiation about
which possibilities are ‘on the table’ displayed in sentences like “Let’s leave
that possibility out of the picture for the moment”.
The closest account to ours that we are aware of is Eric Swanson’s treat-
ment of the language of subjective uncertainty [Swa06b], elaborated in [Swa06a];
his “coarse credal spaces” are very closely analogous to the aggregated states
and outcomes in our decision-theoretic formulation. We agree wholeheartedly
with his insight that “might”-statements can be appropriately used without
any expectation that they will be informative in the usual propositional sense
of removing possibilities from play, and that such use is in fact based on the
hope that adding possibilities will be helpful to the addressee. What awareness
brings to the party is a notion of excluded possibility that is both absolute and
easily overturned.
Another area where notions of considering or ignoring possibilities appear
very natural is in assessing the truth of conditionals in discourse. There has re-
cently been some interest in the question how the acceptability of conditional
sentences depends on their sequential presentation [F01; Gil07; Wil08]. Sensi-
tivity to ordering sequence implies some sort of dynamic effect, and aware-
ness dynamics indeed seem a fairly good intuition to explain the observed
order sensitivity (for a proposal closely related to our views on the matter see
[Mos07]).
A ﬁnal, and much more speculative, area of potential linguistic applica-
tion is to vagueness. We can relate this again to [Lew79]; there Lewis gave an35
account in terms of changing “standards of precision” that can make an utter-
ance of “France is hexagonal” true (or acceptable) in one context and untrue
(or unacceptable) in another. A hint in the direction of unawareness is given
by Lewis’ observation that, as in the case of possibility modals, ‘accommoda-
tion’ proceeds much more smoothly in the direction of increasing standards of
precision than for decreasing them. If a standard is deﬁned in terms of a set
of alternatives (for instance “square”, “boot-shaped”, and “octagonal”) and
the best alternative from the set is considered “true enough” according to the
standard, then introducing new alternatives via awareness can raise the stan-
dards of precision but never lower them. One can think of possibilities here as
literally the measurement markers on some device: if we include only the 20-
mile markers then it’s 100 miles to Chicago, but add some more measurement
possibilities and all of a sudden it’s 106. As we’ve deﬁned aggregation this
won’t work, since the equivalence relation gives rise to a sorites paradox; the
open question is whether unawareness might add anything to your favourite
sorites-proof account. At least this account gives an easy explanation for the
asymmetry that Lewis has noted.
6 Conclusion
We have tried to cover a lot of ground in this paper; it’s quite likely that we
haven’t succeeded in convincing the reader of everything. This is a good point
to take stock, and state clearly which notions we think are central and which
can be discarded while still agreeing with the endeavour in general.
We’ve used three slogans to give intuitions about unawareness:
1. Unawareness is not uncertainty (it cannot be represented formally by
uncertainty; it typically takes the form of implicit beliefs).
2. Unawareness is not introspective (it must be represented intensionally;
the modeller’s language is not the agent’s language).
3. Unawareness is easily overturned (it stems from absent-mindedness or
inattentiveness; mere mention of possibilities, whatever the linguistic
setting, sufﬁces).
In particular the third slogan shows how our notion differs from the version
common in the rational choice literature; as far as we can see, this characteris-
tic is key for a linguistic application of the idea.
We’ve modelled unawareness in terms of filtering a background model
through a set of unmentionables (which deﬁne a limited agent language)
and assumptions, and distinguished between implicit and explicit beliefs.
These are key concepts we would like to see generally adopted, whatever the
speciﬁc implementation.
In decision theory we’ve made a more speciﬁc suggestion: that decision
problems be considered a subjective representation of the relevant features of
the situation, and that unawareness models be used whenever that subjective
notion of relevance may undergo revision over time. The technical details of
our model produce numerically precise and potentially quite complex revi-
sions of decision problems by way of simple updates to awareness structures.36
In linguistics we’ve argued that awareness dynamics are a natural fea-
ture in conversation. We have offered a toy example of pragmatic reasoning
centered on a conversational move intended ﬁrst and foremost to bring a pos-
sibility to awareness. A further example is offered by the speculative sugges-
tions of the previous section: they are intended not as assertions but simply
to make the reader aware of the impressive range of possibilities this notion
might fruitfully be applied to.
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